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I. INTRODUCTION
This comment focuses on a poorly designed provision (the "pension
provision," as I shall call it) of the Taft-Hartley Act.' The provision makes
it unlawful for a union to have exclusive control of a pension fund if the
employer contributes to it. This comment will demonstrate that the
t Associate, Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania;
J.D. University of Pennsylvania Law School 2001; Ph.D. University of Washington 1997;
M.A. University of Washington 1992; B.A. University of Washington 1990. I would like to
thank Tiffany Fonseca and the other editors of the Journal of Labor & Employment Law for
all of their hard work improving this Comment. I would also like to give special thanks to
Katie Worthman, from whom I have learned much.
I. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1994). This
section targets not only pension funds, but any "welfare fund" to which the employer
contributes (for example, a fund that pays employees' medical expenses or provides
vacation benefits would be covered, as well). 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(A). To keep the
discussion focused, I will, for the most part, concentrate on those aspects of Section 186 that
affect pension funds, to the exclusion of other sorts of funds that a collective bargaining
agreement might establish.
2. A "willful and intentional" violation of the section is a felony punishable by a fine
of not more than $15,000, or imprisonment for not more than five years (unless the amount
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pension provision bears no rational relationship to its avowed objective-
the prevention of union fraud and abuse in the administration of a pension
fund. I shall argue that this objective would be much better served by
repealing the pension provision and replacing it with statutory prohibitions
targeting union abuse directly.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Pension Funds and Union Capitalism
In his book, Which Side Are You On?, labor lawyer Thomas
Geoghegan recounts a conversation he once had with a delegation of
Chinese officials.3 One member of the delegation asked him, "Why are
American workers so powerless? ' 4 Another asked, "Why don't American
workers own more stock?"5 In Geoghegan's mind these questions came to
the same thing. To the extent that workers own stock, in his view, the
distinction between "capitalist" and "laborer" blurs, and the power that
comes from "owning the means of production" is placed in the workers'
hands.6
Geoghegan is not alone in making this observation. Other
commentators and theorists who have noted the relationship, however,
maintain that, to a large extent, this merging of the capitalist and laborer
classes has already taken place. The way in which a "life cycle" model of
saving replaces the classical segregated model in which a capitalist (i.e.,
nonworking) class provides the necessary investment to fuel production
provides one illustration of this viewpoint 7 According to this life cycle
model, people borrow money in young adulthood in order to finance their
8education and develop marketable skills. As they grow older, they pay
back these loans and save for retirement. 9 In retirement, they live off the
savings of their productive years.'0  Thus, the source of capital for
production lies not in a class, but rather in a generation, namely, the
of money involved is less than $1,000, in which case it is a misdemeanor subject to a fine of
not more than $10,000, or imprisonment for not more than one year). 29 U.S.C. §
186(d)(1).
3. THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON? 244 (1991).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. William H. Simon, The Prospects of Pension Fund Socialism, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 251, 252 (1993).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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generation currently saving for retirement.1
In the life cycle model, then, we should expect to find that a
substantial portion of society's productive equity is held in the assets of
pension funds- one of the primary means by which working people save
for retirement. 2 Indeed, these pension assets have been described as "the
predominant source of capital for the economy.' '13  According to the
Federal Reserve Statistical Release, approximately 4.6 trillion dollars is
held in the pension funds of private employees. 14 In 1995, these funds
owned almost eighteen percent of outstanding U.S. corporate equity. 15 In
that same year, institutional investors, of which pension funds represent the
largest share, held 57.2% of the equity of the top 1,000 corporations.' 6 So,
the life cycle model of saving and investment appears to be corroborated by
the fact that employees' pension funds own a significant portion of the
companies who employ them.
Nevertheless, in the realm of pension funds, to own is not to control.
"Though vested participants [in a pension fund] have a recognized
ownership interest in the assets held for their benefit, there is no legal right
to control deriving from this reality."'17 As a result, some commentators
maintain that, rather than deriving the benefits of ownership from their
pension funds, the interests of many workers have in fact been undermined
by them.' In particular, unions, establishing through collective bargaining
approximately forty percent of all private sector plans, 9 have "looked with
disgust at the investment of their pension assets in foreign and domestic
nonunion competition in industry .... ,20 These funds, in their estimation,
have been "used to finance the loss of their members' jobs and retirement
income security.' The past two decades have seen "unanticipated
employment and wage losses.., associated with deindustrialization in the
manufacturing sector and deregulation in the transportation and
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. NEW YORK STATE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION COUNCIL, COMPETITIVE PLUS:
ECONOMICALLY TARGETED INVESTMENTS BY PENSION FuNDs 1(1990).
14. Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, FED. RESERVE STAT. RELEASE, Fourth
Quarter, 2000, at 111 [hereinafter Flow of Funds].
15. Private Pension Plans, Participation, and Assets, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH
INsTrruTE FACTS FROM EBRI, 1998, available at http://www.ebri.org/facts/0697fact.htm.
The latest figures in EBRI's report are from 1997.
16. CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 24(1997).
17. Paul J. Wessel, Comment, Job Creation for Union Members Through Pension Fund
Investment, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 323, 328-29 (1986).
18. Id. at 330.
19. Id. at 328.
20. Id. at 324.
21. Id.
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communication sectors .... ,22 In the Chicago area alone, to take one
example, 70,000 steelworkers lost their jobs in the 1980s.23 Some have
suggested that perhaps "worker-owners would be more careful and less
opportunistic about laying off their fellows than would investor owners. 24
It should come as no surprise, then, that many commentators have
advocated worker control of pension funds to go along with their
acknowledged ownership interest. It is likewise unsurprising that these
advocates should look upon unions as the natural conduit for this control.
What could be more natural than a union, having established a pension
fund for its members, managing that fund's investments? Indeed, the
virtues of such an arrangement have been exhaustively catalogued. As
Paul Wessel has discussed, unions could use the leverage provided by
pension funds in several ways, among them: in "coordinated capital
investment boycott campaigns against antiunion industries," 5 in the
"exercise of shareholder voting rights, 26 in the use of funds to "finance
home mortgages or other loans" for union members, 27 and in the
"investment of assets in unionized businesses to create jobs ....,2s
Geoghegan goes a step further and asserts that the key to union and
worker power lies in the control of pension funds.29 As he sees it, before
the Taft-Hartley Act was passed in 1947, unions "had [the] chance to buy
up the country. 30 John L. Lewis, the United Mine Workers of America
President, had struggled to create a pension and welfare fund financed by
contributions from the coal industry.3' When he finally succeeded, he "had
the money at last to be a player.... He began using the fund to buy up
stock, buy up companies, even buy up a bank, the National Bank of
Washington. 32 His actions would not, however, usher in an era of "worker
capitalism." In an effort to prevent a union from "shaking down'33 an
employer, Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 made it unlawful for
an employer to "pay, lend, or deliver.., any money or other thing of
22. Simon, supra note 7, at 253.
23. GEOGHEGAN, supra note 3, at 84. Geoghegan goes on to ask: "Now where were
they? Nobody really knows.... Despite all our universities, research grants, etc., we don't
know ultimately where these people went." Id. at 88.
24. Simon, supra note 7, at 253-54.
25. Wessel, supra note 17, at 325.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 326.
28. Id.
29. GEOGHEGAN, supra note 3, at 245.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. See discussion infra Part I.B.
33. 93 CONG. REc. 4876 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 at 1310 (1985) (quoting Sen. Taft).
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value" to a representative of her employees. 34 Since this language would
prohibit an employer from contributing to a pension fund established by a
union, the drafters of Taft-Hartley were careful to include an exception
covering such contributions, provided that the pension fund is jointly
administered by the employer and the union.35 This "pension provision," as
I am calling it, is the principal factor that has undermined organized labor's
ability to own and control stock according to Geoghegan. 36 The drafters of
Taft-Hartley were protecting American business from a new threat-"the
threat of 'union capitalism,' a labor dominated-economy, with labor leaders
like Lewis making the deals. 37
Whether a "labor dominated economy" was the danger foremost in
Congress' mind when it enacted Taft-Hartley is unclear. As we shall see
shortly, this was not the stated target, although it may emerge as the most
plausible motive when the stated rationale of the pension provision buckles
under scrutiny.3" Regardless of Congress' fears, however, a labor
dominated economy would not at present be quite in reach, even if unions
controlled their members' pension funds. It is estimated that in 1997,
pension funds for union members at private companies held just over $350
billion.39 Unions have direct control only over the portion of this money
held in so-called "Taft-Hartley" funds jointly administered with
employers.40 Estimates of the number of these jointly administered plans,
as well as the amount of assets they hold, vary.41 In 1992, the Department
of Labor, estimated the number of such funds to be 3,109, with $215 billion
in assets.42 This is a small fraction of the $4.6 trillion held in private
pension funds.43  It is, nevertheless, a substantial enough fraction that
"labor-union shareholders cannot be taken lightly. '44 Perhaps, then, since a
labor dominated economy is at present out of reach, unions could
nevertheless use the substantial fraction of pension fund assets they do
control to further their own ends.
34. 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (1994).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B).
36. GEOGHEGAN, supra note 3, at 245.
37. Id. at 246.
38. See discussion infra Part Ill.
39. Aaron Bernstein, "Working Capital": Labor's New Weapon?, Bus. WK., Sept. 29,
1997, at 110.
40. Wessel, supra note 17.
41. Id. at 325 n.6 (explaining that "the Department of Labor does not require that
pension plans disclose whether or not they are established through collective bargaining,
making statistics difficult to compile").
42. Paul Sweeney, Clash by Proxy, ACROSS THE BOARD, May 1996, at 21, 22; see also
JAMES MELTON & MATrHEW KEENAN, THE SOCIALLY RESPONSIVE PORTFOLIO 2 (1994)
(estimating the assets of Taft-Hartley plans to be $216 billion in 1992).
43. FLOW OF FUNDS, supra note 14, at 111.
44. Sweeney, supra note 42, at 22.
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Working within Taft-Hartley's framework of joint administration,
some unions have had moderate success advancing their interests with
pension fund leverage. 4' Fifty-nine unions joined The United Mine
Workers in a capital boycott campaign against a Duke Power Company
plant in Kentucky where the Mineworkers were striking.46  When the
unions threatened not to buy Duke Power stock unless the company signed
the contract, the company "caved in almost immediately.,
47
There has also been a rise in recent a years of so-called "shareholder
activism" by unions. In the 1980s, commentators remarked on the seeming
apathy of unions concerning their shareholder voting rights.4 s In the 1990s,
however, unions became much more active, submitting more shareholder
proposals at corporate annual meetings than many other groups,49 and
occasionally winning majorities.50
Finally, there have been efforts by unions to use pension funds to
create union jobs. The AFL-CIO, for instance, maintains a Housing
Investment Trust and a Building Investment Trust, to finance union
5 52construction projects.5 ' Additionally, in the case of Donovan v. Walton,
the Department of Labor sued officers of Local 675, International Union of
Operating Engineers, claiming that they had violated their fiduciary
obligations under ERISA by investing their pension fund primarily in real
estate projects involving union labor.53 The trial court held in favor of the
defendants, ruling that the union officers had taken adequate precautions to
ensure that the investments were prudent.
54
These examples show that while Taft-Hartley's pension provision
dramatically limits the control a union may exercise over a pension fund by
45. JEREMY RIFKIN & RANDY BARBER, THE NORTH WILL RISE AGAIN: PENSIONS,
POWER, AND POLITICS IN THE 1980s 155-56 (1978).
46. Id. at 164.
47. Id.
48. E.g., Ruth Kenner Thompson, Union Use of Public Proxy Resolutions, LAB. STUD.
J., Fall 1988, at 40.
49. See BRANCATO, supra note 16, at 119-25. According to Brancato, unions submitted
thirty-two proposals in 1994, and forty-eight in 1995. Id. at 124. In 1991, 1992, and 1993,
these numbers were 26, 32, and 30, respectively. MELTON & KEENAN, supra note 42, at
114. These proposals have ranged from "corporate governance" issues (e.g., rescinding
poison pills, declassifying boards, instituting confidential voting, adopting cumulative
voting), to social or labor issues (e.g., plant closings, workplace safety, equal employment,
and health care policy). Id. at 115.
50. See Sweeney, supra note 42, at 25; see also BRANCATO, supra note 16, at 121.
51. ARTHUR B. SHOSTAK, ROBUST UNIONISM: INNOVATIONS IN THE LABOR MOVEMENT
240 (1991).
52. 609 F. Supp. 1221 (S.D. Fla. 1985), affd sub nom., Brock v. Walton, 794 F.2d 596
(11 th Cir. 1986). Donovan is discussed thoroughly in SHOSTAK, supra note 51. See infra
discussion Part III.C.
53. Donovan, 609 F. Supp at 1245.
54. Id.
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imposing the requirement that the fund be jointly administered with
employer representatives, the union can still use the fund to advance
worker interests if it is able to garner the support of the employer trustees.5
Moreover, in some cases, the union will not encounter much resistance in
this connection.56 For instance, the employer may choose to cooperate with
the union investment plans in the interests of labor peace.57 It also might
readily agree to use pension fund leverage to force the unionization of
unorganized competitors.5
Still, it should be pointed out that unions have had the most success in
using multi-employer funds to their advantage.5 9 A fund of this sort is
easier for a union to dominate because "it puts the union in the position of
having more trustees on the board than any single employer, creating de
facto control of the fund by the union." 60 Thus, the requirement of joint
administration does not alleviate all obstacles to a pro-union investment
agenda. Clearly, if there were no requirement of joint administration, a
union agenda would be much easier to carry out. Accordingly, an advocate
of "union capitalism" would do well to examine the pension provision
closely, to understand its rationale, and expose its defects. That is my aim
in Part I of this comment. Further discussion of the provision itself,
however, first warrants an examination the historical context in which the
pension provision was born.
55. See W. Michael Kaiser, Labor's New Weapon: Pension Fund Leverage; Can Labor
Legally Beat its Plowshares into Swords?, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 409, 415 (1982) (explaining
why no union has complete control over the investment of a pension fund).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 415-16; see also Simon, supra note 7, at 270 n.66 ("Unionized employers are
generally sympathetic to efforts to organize and improve working conditions for their
competitors' employees.").
59. Taft-Hartley permits a union to establish a pension fund through collective
bargaining with several employers simultaneously. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1994). Each of
the employers contributes to the fund, and each is represented on the board of trustees. Id.
The Local 675 fund, discussed supra text accompanying notes 52-54, and infra Part Il.C, is
a multi-employer plan of this sort. See SHOSTAK, supra note 51, at 241 (elaborating on the
details of the fund).
60. Wessel, supra note 17, at 332; see also Kaiser, supra note 55, at 415 (asserting that
in multi-employer situations "union trustees are more likely to stand united than employer
trustees"). Some multi-employer plans follow a "unit bloc rule" that requires a majority of
both union and employer representatives to carry a proposal. See RALF C. JAMES & ESTELLE
DINERSTEIN JAMES, HOFFA AND THE TEAMSTERS: A STUDY OF UNION POwER 221-22 (1965).
Such a rule clearly limits union control even in the multi-employer context. See id.
(discussing Hoffa's insistence on a simple majority rule in administering the Teamster's
Central and Southern States Pension Fund, "leaving him virtual control of the fund").
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B. The History of the Pension Provision
Why did Congress feel compelled to include in Taft-Hartley a
prohibition against a union having exclusive control of a pension fund if
the employer contributes to it? If one examines the legislative history, it
appears that the immediate impetus for the prohibition was the United Mine
Workers fund that Geoghegan mentions.6'
In negotiations with mine operators in 1946, Lewis demanded that a
health and pension fund be created and financed by a ten cent royalty on
62each ton of coal mined. The negotiations deadlocked, and the miners
struck.63 When, after several weeks, the miners and operators had still not
reached an agreement, President Truman ordered Secretary of the Interior
Julius A. Krug to seize the mines under the War Labor Disputes Act.
64
Krug and Lewis then signed an agreement that established the desired
fund.65 It would be administered by three trustees (one named by the
union, one by the government, and a third "neutral" trustee named by
agreement between the parties), and financed by a royalty of five cents paid
66for each ton of coal mined. When the War Labor Disputes Act expired in
1947, and the mines were returned to the operators, a new agreement was
reached that preserved the fund and the three-trustee system of
administration.67 While the mine operators had some say in managing the
assets (they were able to name one trustee), some commentators maintain
that Lewis, for practical purposes, achieved complete control when he
succeeded in having his friend Josephine Roche named as the neutral
trustee.68
The drafters of Taft-Hartley explicitly acknowledged that its pension
provision was formulated in response to these developments:
The occasion of the amendment [the provision] was the demand
made by the United Mine Workers of America that a tax of 10
cents a ton be levied on all coal mined, and that the tax so levied
61. 93 CONG. REc. 4876 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1310 (1985); see supra notes 31-32 and
accompanying text.
62. RAYMOND MUNTS, BARGAINING FOR HEALTH 33 (1967); see also MELVYN
DUBOFSKY & WARREN VAN TINE, JOHN L. LEWIS: A BIOGRAPHY 460-61 (1977).
63. DUBOFSKY & VAN TINE, supra note 62, at 460-61.
64. MUNTS, supra note 62, at 33; see also DUBOFSKY & VAN TINE, supra note 62, at
461.
65. MUNTS, supra note 62, at 33.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. George S. Goldstein, The Rise and Decline of the UMWA Health and Retirement
Funds Program, 1946-1995, in THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA: A MODEL OF
INDUSTRIAL SOLIDARITY? 239, 248 (John H. M. Laslett ed. 1996); MUNTS, supra note 62, at
35.
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be paid into a general welfare fund to be administered by the
union for practically any purpose the union considered to come
within the term "welfare." Of course, the result of such a
proceeding, if there is no restriction, is to build up a tremendous
fund in the hands of the officers of the labor union.., which they
may use indiscriminately.69
It is clear, however, that in the view of the drafters, it was not only the
Mineworkers who could not be trusted to manage a pension fund:
The tendency is to demand a welfare fund as much in the power
of the union as possible. Certainly unless we impose some
restrictions we shall find that the welfare fund will become
merely a war chest for the particular union, and that the
employees for whose benefit it is supposed to be established, for
certain definite welfare purposes, will have no legal rights ... .70
Thus was born the pension provision of Taft-Hartley, making it illegal
for a union to have exclusive control of a pension fund to which the
employer contributes. The provision is odd for a number of reasons, not
the least of which is that the United Mine Workers fund inspiring the
provision was not exclusively controlled by the union. As discussed above,
both the agreement with the government and the follow-up agreement with
the mine operators provided for joint administration of the fund. Thus, in
point of fact, the pension provision did not legislate out of existence a
dangerously out-of-control fund. Quite the contrary, Lewis had agreed to
the very sort of fund required by the pension provision. Hence, it is not
clear that the historical situation warranted the panicked tone evidenced in
the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act. However, in addition to this
absence of an actual historically valid rationale for the pension provision, it
is also deeply flawed in its very design. This is the subject of the next
section.
III. WHY THE PENSION PROVISION IS FLAWED
The pension provision has four flaws. First, it imposes inefficient
restrictions on the bargaining process by prohibiting an employer from
"bargaining away" her right to (partial) control of a pension fund, even if
she deems such abdication to be in her best interest. Second, it is grossly
overinclusive insofar as it targets union abuse by prohibiting the existence
of a union controlled fund to which the employer contributes, rather than
69. 93 CONG. REC. 4876 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1310-11 (1985) (statement of Sen. Taft).
70. Id. at 1877.
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prohibiting abuse of such a fund directly. Third, it is grossly
underinclusive insofar as it fails to reach union controlled funds to which
an employer does not contribute. And fourth, it is superfluous, since
federal laws dealing with the fiduciary obligations of fund trustees are
sufficient to deter the abuse the pension provision targets. I shall consider
these in turn.
A. The Pension Provision Imposes Inefficient Restrictions on the
Bargaining Process
One can easily imagine that an employer engaged in the process of
negotiating a collective bargaining agreement would regard it as in her best
interest to agree to contribute to a pension fund that benefits her employees.
One might also take it for granted that the employer would want to exert
some control over the fund, insofar as she contributes to it. Indeed, the
pension provision seems to be based on this assumption, to the extent that it
guarantees the employer at least equal voice in the administration of a
pension fund to which she contributes, but does not give a similar
guarantee to the union.7' The implication is that the employer would
(rightfully) wish to have a say in the administration of the fund since her
money is at stake. The union, however, is not an interested party in the
same fashion as the employer, and is thus not entitled to any measure of
control over the fund (though the employer might agree to allow joint
administration).72 Natural as this assumption may be, on reflection it is
clear that certain employers might conclude that they have no interest in
taking on the burdens associated with jointly administering a pension
fund.73 They ought, therefore, to be able to bargain out of these burdens.
However, the pension provision will not allow for this option.
Several senators anticipated this problem when they first debated the
pension provision on the Senate floor. Senator Ball of Minnesota, who
introduced the amendment containing the provision, explained that it would
give employees the "right to go into court to protect their interest in...
[their] benefits, if necessary." 74 Senator Morse of Oregon recognized that
71. See Indep. Assoc. of Mut. Employees of N.Y. State v. N.Y. Racing Assoc., 398
F.2d 587, 591 (2d Cir. 1968).
What Congress wished to accomplish by enacting Section 302 [the pension
provision] was to give the employer an equal voice with the union in the
administration of union-established welfare funds.... There is nothing in the
history of the legislation to indicate that it was meant to require an employer to
give a union equal voice in employer-established welfare funds.
Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 93 CONG. REc. 4805 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
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this aspect of the provision would discourage some employers from
agreeing to contribute to a fund.75 They would "not want to be involved in
the event some member of the union had a complaint and went to court.
' 76
He maintained that many employers "do not want to have any participation
in welfare funds; they certainly do not want to be required, by the
compulsion of law, to take part in welfare funds. 77  Indeed, where
"employers were given equal participation, many of them voluntarily asked
to be relieved of it.
' 78
Developments in the law since the pension provision was originally
debated have added to the burdens associated with control of a pension
fund. Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA"), an employer who jointly administers a pension fund would
have the status of a fiduciary, and would have all of the obligations that go
with that status.79  An employer might well conclude that she is not
interested in undertaking fiduciary responsibilities and wish the union to be
fully accountable to the employees instead. An efficient collective
bargaining process would allow the parties to reach terms that reflect such
a judgment on the employer's part. Such an arrangement would leave both
parties better off, since the union would presumably prefer to have
exclusive control of the pension fund, and the employer would be relieved
of burdens she prefers not to take on. Nonetheless, as it is, the pension
provision interferes with the bargaining process, and will thus, in some
instances, lead to a result neither party prefers. 0
B. The Pension Provision is Grossly Overinclusive
As we have seen, the pension provision was intended to target the
perceived potential for abuse by unions in the administration of pension
funds, and to prevent such funds from becoming "rackets" in the words of
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 1304 (1985) (statement of Sen. Ball).
75. Id. at 4882 (statement of Sen. Morse).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (1994); see
DAN M. MCGILL ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 54 (7th ed. 1996) (discussing
the duties of fiduciaries in the management of pension funds).
80. Senator Murray of Montana maintained that the pension provision "constitutes a
direct threat to... [one of] our most precious heritages." 93 CONG. REc. 4879 (1947),
reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT,
1947, at 1316 (1985). He asserted: "The right of liberty to contract has always been
regarded by us as an essential condition to the functioning of a free society. Why should we
interfere with this right, when the subject of the contract is a health and welfare fund hurting
no one and benefiting many?" Id.
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senators Ball and Taft." The pension provision does not, however, directly
prohibit such abuse. Rather, it goes further and prohibits the existence of
union controlled funds. The pension provision thus creates a "proxy
crime." That is, it prohibits innocent behavior as a means of reaching
offensive behavior.82 If it is deemed too difficult to root out union abuse of
exclusively controlled funds, a much simpler course is to merely prohibit
unions from having exclusive control of pension funds altogether. This is
the advantage of proxy crimes in general - the cost of enforcing a
prohibition that covers innocent conduct thought to be characteristically
associated with some offensive behavior is often much lower than if the
prohibition were directed only to the offensive behavior itself.83 Proxy
crimes save costs in two respects. First, they are less expensive for the
state to enforce ex post, for it would often be much more difficult for the
state to prove that an agent had engaged in the targeted offensive conduct
than it would be for the state to prove the innocent conduct associated with
it.84 From this perspective, it is clearly much easier to prove the existence
of an exclusively union controlled pension fund than it would be to prove
that the union had abused that fund. Second, proxy crimes can provide
more efficient deterrence ex ante, since they enable the state to prevent
offensive conduct from occurring in the first place, by preventing innocent
activity that leads to it." Here again, the proxy crime embodied in the
pension provision might seem justified inasmuch as preventing the
existence of a union controlled fund appears to be a highly effective means
of preventing abuse of such a fund.
Despite these advantages that attach to the pension provision, the
81. Id. at 4805, 4877.
82. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME 783 (1997) ("[I]n the criminal law we
sometimes use one morally innocuous act as a proxy for another, morally wrongful act or
mental state.").
83. Id. at 784.
84. See id. at 783.
Thus, many states criminalize the possession of certain sorts of tools useful
exclusively for burglaries. The state can prove knowing possession of burglary
tools more easily than it can prove intent to burgle, or attempted burglary, so
such laws are argued for on this evidentiary ground.
Id.
85. See id. at 784.
Sometimes proxy crimes are defended.., on the preventive ground that they
isolate a convenient point in time from which it is predictable that some moral
wrongs will occur, and such wrongs can thus be efficiently prevented by
preventing the earlier, non-wrongful act. It may be easier for the police to
prevent burglaries by allowing them to arrest people for possession of burglary
tools, for example, than it is to do so by waiting for the possessor to actually
attempt a break-in with such tools.
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prohibition comes with significant costs of its own. By prohibiting any and
all union controlled pension funds, the provision reaches many funds that
might be fairly and effectively administered under the exclusive control of
the union.86 It may be that in some instances, the union can best administer
the fund. Some of the senators who debated the pension provision before
its adoption. As Senator Pepper put it, pension funds are established for the
benefit of the workers. Is it not reasonable to suppose that if the funds are
for the benefit of the workers, the workers will be the ones chiefly
concerned in their proper administration and disbursement? Can any union
leader escape accountability, first, to the law, and secondly, to his own
union membership, for the misuse, misapplication, or diversion of welfare
funds?
87
In addition, Senator Murray pointed to the potential inefficiencies of a
system of joint administration. For many employers as he put it:
it would mean additional record keeping, resulting in increased
costs.... requiring them to devote a part of their time and energy
to the supervision of activities which are not of direct concern to
them. Time and energy so lost could be better applied directly to
increasing production, with a consequent beneficial effect to the
entire economy."
So, for at least two reasons, a union might administer a pension fund
more cheaply and efficiently than the employer. First, the union is
accountable to its members in a way the employer is not. Union officers,
therefore, have an added incentive to manage funds appropriately. Second,
the union is in the business of protecting the interests of the employees,
while the employer is not. Seeing that a pension fund is appropriately
managed, therefore, falls squarely in the purview of the union, but seems
tangential to the concerns of the employer. Such a task would, in
consequence, often be best left in the hands of the union.
We must thus balance the potential benefits of the pension provision
and its possible effectiveness in preventing union abuse against its potential
costs, namely the potentially inefficient system of administration it
establishes.8 9 This requires information we do not, unfortunately, possess.
86. 93 CONG. REc. 4806 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 at 1306 (1985) (remarks of Sen. Pepper)
(noting that Congress has been presented with information showing that multiple
organizations and unions had welfare funds administrated by the employees themselves and
suggesting that Congress encourage unions to continue this practice until a national
principle is adopted).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 4879 (remarks of Sen. Murray).
89. See FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 145-49 (1991) (discussing the
"efficiency argument" for the overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness of a rule when the
benefits of such over or underinclusiveness outweigh the costs).
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Specifically, we need some indication of how frequently unions would
abuse pension funds if they obtained exclusive control. If such abuse
would be comparatively rare, then the advantages of the pension provision
are unlikely to outweigh its costs. However, if unions are inherently
corrupt, as some would maintain, so that nearly every union would abuse
exclusive control, then the balance presumably tips in the other direction.
Since we have no track-record of exclusive union control, it is difficult to
assess the tendency for abuse.
There are certainly vivid examples of union improprieties that one
could point to in support of the pension provision. Perhaps the most
striking example in this connection is the series of transactions involving
the Teamsters' Central and Southern States Pension Fund ("CSPF') that
led to the convictions of James R. Hoffa and six of his associates in 1964.90
Hoffa, as he himself put it, was in the pension business "to make friends"9'
(i.e., to forge alliances useful to the Teamsters and to the cause of labor
generally). When the CSPF was first established, the initial funds were
placed in banks in cities throughout the central and southern states.92 These
banks were chosen on the basis of strategic importance and influence, and
not on the basis of economic considerations such as interest rates and
handling fees.93 Over the next few years, these bank trust accounts became
an increasingly smaller percentage of the CSPF's holdings as Hoffa
became more attracted to investments in real estate.94 By 1962, sixty-nine
percent of the fund's assets were invested in mortgages, most of which
were not government guaranteed.95  Hoffa was interested in real estate
investments because they seemed to offer a more effective means of
furthering his influence.9 6 In 1956, for example, Hoffa pressured the other
CSPF trustees to approve a loan to Hank Greenspun, editor of the Las
Vegas Sun, who planned to build a golf course.97 Hoffa's rationale was that
"this gentleman is an influential man in Las Vegas." 98 More generally,
90. JAMES & JAMES, supra note 60, at 21-22.
91. Id. at 269 (relating a personal communication with Hoffa).
92. Id. at 242.
93. See id. at 229 (quoting Hoffa at a meeting of the CSPF Board of Trustees: "Each
one of these cities is in a powerful situation in my opinion. If you can get it going round
right you will do yourselves a lot of good to take care of our industry here"). According to
James and James, "[T]his dispersion of reserves has cost the Fund at least $150,000 thus far
and would have cost much more had the practice continued as originally planned." Id. at
229.
94. Id. at 233-37.
95. Id. at 238. The figure of 69% contrasts with a 3.2% investment in mortgages by
corporate pension funds in the same year, most of which were government guaranteed. Id.
at 238.
96. Id. at 237.
97. Id. at 235.
98. Id. (quoting minutes of the meeting of trustees).
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the CSPF has specialized in speculative mortgages on ventures which,
because of their geographic and functional peculiarities, or because of the
lack of experience and financial stability of their backers, other lending
institutions are reluctant to touch. The Fund, apparently, aims to keep its
borrowers happy even if this means it is not maximizing its yield,
protecting its capital, or making a social contribution. Thus, large loans are
offered, based on a generous percentage of optimistic appraisals, and
interest rates charged which are more appropriate for better quality
borrowers. Understandably, the customers seem highly satisfied with their
bargain packages of money.99
As a result of mortgage foreclosures, and the failure to charge a
market interest rate, the CSPF lost $5 to $10 million under Hoffa's
leadership. l00 While the fund grew from approximately $10 million in
1956 to $169 million in 1962, l0l most of this increase was due to the
continued influx of employer contributions, totaling roughly $6 million per
month.'0 2 The CSPF purportedly had an average rate of return of 4%
during this period, compared with an average of 3.5% for all corporate
pension plans, but this rate was artificially inflated by adept accounting and
refinancing techniques.0 3
Hoffa and some of his associates also personally profited from many
of the CSPF's transactions.' °4 One of the largest borrowers from CSPF at
this time was Morris Dalitz, a Las Vegas hotel owner.'0 5 When the
employers in the Detroit Laundry Institute were unable to settle a dispute
with the laundry drivers' local, Dalitz (also one of the laundry owners)
introduced them to Joe Holtzman, a labor consultant "close to Hoffa."'
0 6
Hoffa subsequently instructed the local to sign the contract in dispute.10 7
Holtzman was paid a consulting fee of $17,500, which was "at least
partially passed on to Hoffa."' '
99. Id. at 260. The authors, it should be recalled, wrote this passage in 1965. See
JAMES & JAMES, supra note 60, at 221-22.
100. JAMES & JAMES, supra note 60, at 296.
101. Id. at240.
102. Id. at 216.
103. Id. at 294.
104. Id. at 273.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 273.
108. Id. There are a multitude of examples of inappropriate CSPF dealings by which
Hoffa and others directly or indirectly profited. Id. at 269-83 (listing other examples). The
CSPF connection in the transaction described here is, admittedly, somewhat tenuous. Still,
Hoffa at least indirectly profited from his relationship with Dalitz. Id. at 273. The example
shows also that Hoffa was not necessarily interested in "union capitalism" or "pension fund
socialism," and might be induced to undermine labor's interests for the sake of personal
financial gain. Id. at 258-60.
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These dealings involving the CSPF might well incline one to support
the pension provision. But cases of this sort must be balanced by cases in
which unions have properly, indeed admirably, managed pension funds.
The pension fund of Local 675, International Union of Operating
Engineers, at issue in Donovan v. Walton,'09 is a leading example. When
Dennis Walton became business manager of Local 675 in 1976, the
pension fund, jointly managed with several employers, was earning only a
1.8% return." ° At the time, the Florida real estate market was strong, and
accordingly the fund, under Walton's leadership, began carefully
investigating potential real estate investments."' Such investments would
serve the dual strategy of, first, improving the fund's rate of return, and
second, of providing union jobs.' 2  This was achieved by the fund's
resolve only to invest in construction projects built by union contractors.13
Among these carefully selected real-estate investments, was the
purchase of a ninety-five acre tract on which the fund planned to build an
office park. 14 The fund paid $25,000 per acre, and an additional $4 million
on roads, sewers, and other improvements." 5 It also built an office
complex, part of which it rented to Local 675 at a rate equal to a ten percent
return on the building's Cost. 1 6 The fund retained an independent party to
negotiate the union's lease and hired an independent consulting firm to
evaluate the project's overall viability." 7 The fund later sold much of the
land to a developer for $174,000 per acre." 8 As a result of this and other
real estate transactions, Local 675's pension fund grew from $16 million in
1979 to $44 million in 1986.1 9 In contrast to the CSPF fund,' 20 most of this
growth was due to return on the fund's investments. Employer
contributions during this period amounted only to approximately $8 million
dollars. 22 Thus, the Local 675 fund earned an exemplary return, and in the
109. 609 F. Supp. 1221 (S.D. Fla. 1985); see supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
110. SHOSTAK, supra note 51, at 242.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 243.
113. See id. (stating that the Fund's developer was legally bound to hire only union labor
for 84,000 hours of building work). It is not surprising that employer trustees cooperated in
these investments, since they themselves represented union contractors. See supra note 58
and accompanying text.
114. SHOSTAK, supra note 51, at 243.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 246.
118. Id. at243.
119. Id. at249.
120. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
121. SHOSTAK, supra note 51, at 249.
122. Id. (stating that employee contributions accounted for about one million dollars per
year for the eight year period between 1979-1986).
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process, generated more that $300 million in union construction work.'
21
In 1981, the Department of Labor sued Walton and the other trustees
of the Local 675 fund, claiming they had violated their ERISA fiduciary
obligations. 24 In 1985, the trial court held that by consulting with outside
agents and charging the union rent equal to a ten percent return, the trustees
had acted in the interests of the fund's participants, and had satisfied
ERISA's prudent investor standard.' 25 This judgment was affirmed on
appeal.
126
The Local 675 fund stands in marked contrast to the CSPF under
Hoffa. It provides a useful antidote to any anti-union sentiments the latter
might instill. Surely, if the trustees of the Local 675 fund can generate
union jobs while earning a fourteen percent return, then we cannot say
there is an inherent tendency for unions to abuse their pension funds. It
would therefore seem reasonable to at least experiment with exclusive
union control-the benefits might well outweigh the costs.
C. The Pension Provision is Grossly Underinclusive
Despite all of the concerns about union abuse expressed in the
legislative history, the pension provision does not in actuality prohibit a
union from having exclusive control over a pension fund. 27 It merely
prohibits the union from having exclusive control over a fund if the
employer contributes to it.12 Nothing prevents a union from establishing a
pension fund for itself with the members' dues. Nothing in the pension
provision will prevent the union from abusing such a fund either. Thus, by
prohibiting exclusive control even in cases where the union is not at all
likely to abuse the fund, the pension provision is both overinclusive and
underinclusive, since it will not prevent union abuse in instances where the
employer does not contribute to the fund.
This seems to cast some doubt on the pension provision's stated
rationale. If that provision was indeed motivated by a sense that unions are
inherently prone to abuse funds given to them in trust,"29 then Congress
123. Id.
124. Id. at 244.
125. Donovan v. Walton, 609 F. Supp. 1221, 1242 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
126. Brock v. Walton, 794 F.2d 596 (1lth Cir. 1986).
127. 93 CONG. REc. 4805 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMErNT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 1305 (1985) (remarks of Sen. Pepper,
reading from a committee report).
128. Id.
129. Id. (statement of Sen. Pepper, reading from a committee report) ("The amendment
proceeds on the theory that union leaders should not be permitted, without reference to the
employees, to divert funds paid by the company, to the union treasury or the union officers,
except under the process of strict accountability.")
2001]
232 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 4:1
should have enacted a more stringent prohibition. The Taft-Hartley Act, or
some ancillary piece of legislation, should have made it altogether illegal
for unions to hold funds in trust for their members. Since Congress
stopped short of this, its stated fear of union abuse 30 must not have been
the driving consideration.
What then could have motivated the pension provision? One possible
suggestion is that Congress felt that a union would be more likely to abuse
a fund financed by employer contributions than a fund financed by
members' dues. The union might feel beholden to its members, but might
have less incentive to treat employer contributions with care. This,
nevertheless, seems implausible. Whether money is deposited in a pension
fund via employer contributions or members' dues, it is in either case the
employees' money, paid in exchange for their labor. Thus, the union's
incentive to manage the fund properly should be the same under both
arrangements.
Another suggestion might be that the pension provision was not in fact
motivated by a fear of union abuse, but rather simply by a sense that an
employer is entitled to a have say in the management of its pension fund
contributions. This rationale would not, however, justify the pension
provision, since that provision, as we saw above, makes the employer's
right of joint administration inalienable.13' Even if one feels that an
employer is entitled to some measure of control over the investment of its
contributions, one ought also to recognize an employer's right to waive this
entitlement. In view of the weakness of this suggested rationale, then, it
seems unlikely that Congress would have relied on it.
What in actuality appears to drive the pension provision is an anti-
union animus. When Senator Taft spoke of a union controlled pension
fund as a "war chest," he was not expressing the worry that a union would
make poor investments with its fund. 32 His primary fear, simply, was that
unions would use their funds as leverage in advancing a pro-labor
agenda.133 This lends credence to Geoghegan's suspicion that the pension
provision was in reality a response to "the threat of 'union capitalism,' a
labor-dominated economy, with labor leaders like Lewis making the
deals."' 34 If this was indeed the moving spirit of the pension provision,
then it would be best to abrogate it entirely. The fear of a labor dominated
economy is a chimera. In the absence of a showing that some tangible
economic benefit derives from the regime of joint administration, the
130. Id.
131. See supra Part III.A.
132. 93 CONG. REC. 4876 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947 at 1311 (1985) (remarks of Sen. Taft).
133. Id.
134. GEOGHEGAN, supra note 3, at 246. See supra text accompanying notes 29-37.
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pension provision is nothing but a naked attempt to impair union
bargaining power. This is not enough to warrant its continued existence.
D. The Pension Provision is Superfluous
According to Senator Ball, the pension provision was intended to
ensure that any pension fund established by a union would be a "legitimate
trust fund, used actually for the specified benefits to the employees of the
employers who contribute to them." 35 This puzzled some of the senators at
the time, because existing state law, as well as the common law of trusts,
seemed already to provide that a union fund would be a "legitimate trust
fund."'136 Moreover, today it is even more apparent that the pension
provision's requirement of joint administration is not necessary to ensure
that a fund established by the union is indeed a trust fund. Under the
current federal regulatory scheme, union officers involved in the
administration of a pension fund are fiduciaries. 37 Hence, a union officer
who breaches that duty would be both personally liable to the pension plan
for any losses that result from the breach,"' and also subject to civil fines
under certain conditions.'39 These sanctions should be sufficient to ensure
that the pension fund is actually used for the benefit of the employees.
4
0
The legitimacy of the pension provision can only be maintained by
assuming that the penalties established by ERISA for breach of fiduciary
obligations will not deter abuse by union officers, and that the only solution
for keeping such irresponsible individuals in line is to force them to work
with the employer in administering the fund. However, thinking again of
the Local 675 case, this assumption seems rather doubtful. For it is far
135. 93 CONG. REC. 4805 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 1305 (1985). Ironically, "[i]n application,
both prior to ERISA and since, Taft-Hartley has been treated as concerned primarily with
fraudulent fund dealings by unions and not as applying general fiduciary standards for fund
management." Wessel, supra note 17, at 333-34.
136. "[I]t would seem to me, as a lawyer, that if such funds are established the trade-
union officials who administer them thereby become trustees, subject to all of the common
law and State safeguards against misuses of funds by trustees." 93 CONG. REc. 4881
(1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 1318 (1985) (statement of Sen. Morse).
137. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (1994); DANK. MCGIL ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF
PIVATE PENSIONS 54, 58 (7th ed. 1996).
138. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1109; MCGiLLETAL., supra note 137 at 57.
139. See MCGILL ET AL., supra note 137, at 58.
140. But see GEOGHEGAN, supra note 3, at 152 (stating that ERISA has become "a
sweeping grant of immunity that lets trustees do whatever they like"); see also Dana M.
Muir, Fiduciary Status as an Employer's Shield: The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary Law, 2
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391, 394 (2000) (arguing that while ERISA's fiduciary protections
"set appropriate standards for asset administration," they are deficient in regard to benefit
administration).
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from clear that the union trustees of Local 675's fund would have acted any
less responsibly had they not shared control with employer representatives.
IV. THE ALTERNATIVE
The foregoing discussion shows that the pension provision is deeply
flawed and ought to be repealed. The question then is what should take its
place. One possibility is to remove all restrictions on a union's having
exclusive control of a pension fund to which the employer contributes. The
administration of such funds would be subject to the requirements of
ERISA, but there would be no specific legislation aimed at union
controlled funds. However, this proposal might be considered by some to
be too radical to be credible. Some might feel that while the pension
provision is defective, we still need particular legislation in addition to
ERISA that targets union controlled funds. In that case, I want to outline
two additional proposals.
First, one could institute criminal penalties in the case of union abuse
to go along with the civil penalties provided by ERISA. The implication of
this proposal is that the tendency for union abuse is strong enough that,
while not requiring joint administration with the employer, some added
incentive is needed to make the union behave.
The problem with this proposal is that it rests on the same bias that
animated the original pension provision, namely the feeling that unions are
more likely than other pension plan sponsors to abuse the fund and breach
their fiduciary obligations. It would be better to move away from this sort
of bias. If after a trial period it were determined that ERISA's civil
penalties are insufficient to deter union misconduct, then it might be
appropriate to consider criminal penalties. Of course, more severe civil
penalties could also be considered. For instance, the union could be made
liable for double or treble damages.'
41
The second proposal I want to consider is more complicated. In the
legislative history of the pension provision, Senator Barkley recognized
that one important check on the behavior of union officers is their
accountability to union members. 142 As he put it, the feeling behind the
pension provision seemed to be that:
the employees for whose benefit this fund is established cannot
141. See JONATHAN SCHONSHECK, ON CRIMINALIZATION 69 (1994) (arguing that less
intrusive means of discouraging behavior ought to be considered before criminal sanctions
are employed).
142. See 93 CONG. REC. 4883 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1321 (1985) (remarks of Sen. Barkley)
(questioning the need for a provision that essentially protects the union members form
themselves).
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be trusted to administer it in their own behalf .... [T]he
employees who have the right to select the business agent, ought
to be protected against their own right to select the business agent
on the theory that he may not represent their interest, and may not
properly administer their funds, although he is chosen by them to
do so ... "'
Recognizing that the members of a union exert some measure of
influence in the conduct of the union, control of the pension fund could be
predicated on some minimal standards of union democracy. That is, the
union could be allowed exclusive control of the pension fund only if the
members of the union, or the employees generally, are allowed some
degree of participation in the administration of the fund.
In this connection, various degrees of worker participation could be
required. On the lowest level, it could be required that the workers vote for
the fund trustees, perhaps on the nomination of the union officers, or on
their own nomination. The model here would be the Teachers Insurance
and Annuity Association of America and College Retirement Equities
Fund.' 44 Since early in its history, participants in TIAA were permitted to
vote for some of the fund's trustees.1 45 Also, since 1990, only participants
elect CREF trustees. 146 These funds are much larger than the average fund
that would be administered by a typical local. 47 If participant election of
trustees is feasible on such a scale, then it ought to be possible on the scale
of local-administered funds as well.
The law could go beyond this minimal degree of worker participation
as well. As discussed at the outset, one advantage of allowing unions to
have exclusive control of pension funds is that workers would be able to
use their assets to further their own interests. 14' Rather than investing their
money in corporations hostile to unions and workers, the union could use
the workers' resources to promote expansion of union jobs. Furthermore,
to insure that the union's investment decisions truly promoted the workers'
interests, some provision could be made to allow worker participation in
the making of investment policy. The fiduciary duties of trustees require
that they make investment decisions in the best interest of the fund, 149 thus
143. Id.
144. WILLIAM C. GREENOUGH, IT'S MY RETIREMENT MONEY, TAKE GOOD CARE OF IT:
THE TIAA-CREF STORY 3 (1990).
145. Id. at 35.
146. Id. at 362.
147. During the events at issue in the Walton case, Local 675's pension fund grew from
$16 million to $44 million. SHOSTAK, supra note 51, at 249. In contrast, TIAA-CREF assets
grew from $10 billion to $83 billion during roughly this same period (1977 to 1989). See
GREENOUGH, supra note 144, at 367.
148. See MCGIL ET AL, supra note 137, at 58-60.
149. Id.
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limiting their ability to make investments for the purpose of promoting
union jobs. 5° Workers, however, could still insist on a policy that, as
between two equally prudent investments, the trustee is to choose the
investment least hostile to the workers' interests, or the one that creates the
greatest number of union jobs.
The question of which of the foregoing proposals is superior is beyond
the scope of this comment, and must be left for another occasion. The
basic principle that underlies them, however, seems beyond doubt. There
is simply no justification for a blanket prohibition against unions having
exclusive control of pension funds.
150. For a full discussion of this problem, see Wessel, supra note 17.
